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The Decline of the Mid-Range Jump Shot in Basketball
Honors Thesis by Shawn Kilcoyne
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis paper is to investigate the strategic shift away from the mid-range
jump shot in basketball over the past decade. This paper will cover the rationale for the
decline of the mid-range, as well as the general impact of data analytics on the way the game
of basketball is played at the professional level. Following a review of the existing literature
relating to the use of analytics in the NBA, this paper will analyze the differences in shooting
habits between two seven-season periods. Data visualization tools, including boxplots,
statistical trends, and distribution plots, will be used to illustrate the changes in shooting
habits from the 2005-06 season through the 2018-19 season. Additionally, a predictive
statistical model will be used to identify the variables that are most important to winning in
the NBA, including shot locations, defensive rating, and pace of play.
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INTRODUCTION
The game of basketball is constantly evolving. Data analytics has overhauled the way players
and teams are evaluated, focusing more on statistics and quantitative measures rather than
evaluating players purely on subjective opinion. The impact of data analytics is most
profound on the shooting habits of both individual players and teams. In the NBA, there has
been a drastic shift in shooting habits over the past decade as a result of the three-point
revolution. The way the game is played in the NBA today is completely different than the way
it was played in the early 2000s. The main difference? The absence of the mid-range shot.

Figure 1: Shot Locations 2001-02 vs 2019-20 (Goldsberry)

The “mid-range” is the area of the court between the three-point line and the area immediately
surrounding the basket, commonly referred to as “the paint”. The charts above depict the shift
in shot locations over the past 20 years in the National Basketball Association (NBA). The
chart on the left shows the 200 most frequent shot locations over the course of the 2001-02
NBA season, while the chart on the right depicts the top 200 shot locations for the 2019-20
NBA season. The mid-range jump shot is now a rarity in the NBA, and league offensive
strategies have changed accordingly. Nowadays, players are primarily encouraged to do one
of two things on offense: drive all the way to the basket or shoot a three-pointer. This has
resulted in the death of the mid-range jump shot.
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This phenomenon is not only evident in the strategies of teams. The shot makeup of a currentday NBA superstar greatly differs from the superstars of the past. For example, the jump shot
habits of Michael Jordan (1996-1998) and James Harden (2018-2020) are essentially inverted,
despite each of them being arguably the greatest scorer of their era.

Figure 2: Jordan vs Harden Jump Shot Locations (Goldsberry)

This paper will explore the rationale behind the decline in the mid-range jump shot,
explaining the inefficiency of the shot using NBA data. The paper will provide a brief history
of the use of data analytics in the NBA and how it led to a shift in league-wide shooting
habits. Using datasets of two seven-year periods, shooting trends will be analyzed using
statistical visualization tools, including boxplots, statistical trends, and distribution plots.
Additionally, a statistical model will be used to analyze the impact of numerous variables on
winning in the NBA, including shooting locations, defensive rating, and pace.
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Analytics in the NBA
The National Basketball Association has embraced analytics unlike any other professional
sports league. Whether it is the tracking of player movement, analysis of specific shot
locations on the court, or lineup analysis to identify a team’s most effective combination of
players, analytics are a major driver behind almost every basketball-related decision an NBA
organization makes.
Matt McLaughlin captures the rise of data analytics in the NBA in his BizTech article How
Data Analytics Is Revolutionizing Sports: “The NBA has embraced data analytics in a way
that surpasses most other major U.S. sports leagues… Nearly every team in the NBA has
hired data analysts as full-time staff members to work with coaches and front office staff.
These analysts help teams identify trends that may improve” (McLaughlin 1). Data analytics
is crucial for success in today’s NBA, and teams such as the Golden State Warriors and
Houston Rockets have taken the lead in the NBA’s recent data analytics revolution.
NBA Commissioner Adam Silver says it himself: “Analytics are part and parcel of virtually
everything we do now… I think it is part of the result” (Wharton School). No league in the
world has embraced the recent data analytics movement like the NBA. From analyzing ticket
sales in order to increase team revenue, to using wearables in order to monitor players’ sleep
schedules, the NBA has incorporated analytics into nearly every aspect of its product.
NBA front offices, coaches, and fans have always used statistics to supplement their
evaluation of players. That said, until the mid-2010s, those statistics were predominantly basic
box score numbers: points, rebounds, assists, steals, blocks, field goal percentage, etc. One of
the major breakthroughs that helped start the current data analytics revolution is the league’s
investment in video tracking technology. At the start of the 2013-2014 season, the NBA
implemented SportsVu software into every NBA arena, a brand specializing in video tracking
tools (Mudric 1). Since the initial investment into video tracking, the NBA has only expanded
its partnerships with data-focused companies, including SecondSpectrum and Sportradar. The
league’s six-year partnership with Second Spectrum and Sportradar are “worth in excess of
$250 million to the NBA” according to Forbes (Heitner 1).
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The leading pioneer for the NBA’s data revolution is former Houston Rocket’s General
Manager Daryl Morey. Coming from an analytical background, Morey was hired as GM of
the Rockets in 2007. Following three consecutive losing seasons, Morey upheaved the
Rocket’s offensive strategy prior to the 2012-2013 season, installing a system centered around
taking highly efficient shot attempts, predominantly three-pointers and layups. Morey also
traded for budding star James Harden and reconstructed the Rocket’s roster to complement his
star guard. In his development of the Rocket’s groundbreaking strategy, Morey took
advantage a simple reality: three is more than two. With the rationale that the 50% increase in
points for a three-pointer outweighs the increased difficulty of a three-point attempt, nearly all
jump shots that the Houston Rockets attempted moving forward have come from behind the
three-point line. Morey’s Rockets are the first example of a team abandoning the mid-range
jumper, the main topic that this paper focuses on. Houston’s strategy has resulted in sustained
success; to date, the team has the third-best record in the NBA since 2012, with only the
Golden State Warriors and San Antonio Spurs posting more wins. The Rocket’s strategy has
been dubbed Moreyball, a reference to the Oakland Athletics infamous Moneyball strategy.
The Evolution of the Three-Point Shot
Out of all the strategic adjustments that have been made since the beginning of the analytics
revolution, the increasing reliance on the three-point shot is the most staggering. In the
modern NBA, teams such as the Houston Rockets and Golden State Warriors structure their
entire offensive attack around the three-point shot. The current reality of the NBA would have
been unimaginable 40 years ago, when the three-point line was first introduced.
The use of the three-point shot increased only marginally over the first decade and a half of its
existence following its introduction prior to the 1979-1980 season. The league average for
attempts per game remained under 10 attempts per game through the 1993-1994 season. The
early 1990s was also a time of decreased scoring across the league. For this reason, the NBA
decided to move the three-point line closer to the basket, from 23 feet, 9 inches and 22 feet at
the corners to a uniform 22 feet around the arch, in an attempt to increase scoring across the
league. The first season after this change, the 1994-1995 season, was subsequently the first
major jump in three-point attempts in league history, to 15.3 attempts.
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As it turns out, the change in the three-point line did not stick, as the move did not result in
the increased scoring that the league anticipated:
Though the average number of 3-point attempts per game increased by over 50
percent, the line was moved back to the original distance after the 1996-97 season
because the change had actually lowered the average score of games. In the three
seasons leading up to the new rule, teams averaged 105.6 points per game. In the three
seasons with the shorter 3-point line, that average fell to 100.8. (Pierson 1)
Although the league moved the three-point line back, this three-year experiment did have
some lasting influence on team shot selection. Coaches had begun to incorporate the threepoint shot into their offensive strategies, while players who specifically excelled in three-point
shooting, dubbed three-point specialists, became more commonplace across the league.
Following the move of the three-point line back to its original distance, three-point attempts
across the league increased slightly each year from 1997 through 2008, but then leveled out at
roughly 18 attempts per team per game for each season through 2012. The 2012-2013 season
represents the real beginning of the three-point revolution, as it was the first season in NBA
history in which the average number of three-point attempts across the league eclipsed 20
attempts per game. That figure rose exponentially over the next 7 seasons, and during the
2018-2019 season, teams attempted 32 three-pointers per game on average (Basketball
Reference).
If one player can be credited with spurring this three-point
barrage, it is Golden State Warriors’ superstar Stephen Curry.
Drafted out of Davidson College in 2009, Curry is largely
considered the greatest three-point shooter of all time. At the
time of this writing, he ranks 6th in NBA history in three-point
percentage, despite the absurd level of difficulty of many of his
attempts. Curry has broken the record for most three-pointers in
a single season three times, setting the current record of 402 in
the 2015-2016 season. Prior to that season, no player had even
eclipsed 300 three-pointers in a season. The adjacent shot chart
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(Goldsberry)
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depicts Curry’s jump shot activity during his 2015-2016 MVP campaign, which features
almost exclusively three-point attempts (Goldsberry, 2020).
Curry’s impact on the game of basketball is historic. As the Ringer’s Kevin O’Conner
highlighted in his 2019 article It’s More Than Just the Shot, Curry’s influence on younger
generations is the greatest since Michael Jordan, arguably the best player of all time:
Kids used to lower their hoops or use trampolines to dunk like Michael Jordan. Now
they shoot from deep like Stephen Curry. Whether it’s good or bad for the game is
moot; it’s happening no matter what. Players of all shapes and sizes are entering the
league with shooting skill. This season, 20 teams attempt over one-third of their shots
from 3. (O’Conner 1)
Curry’s shooting prowess has helped him capture two NBA MVP awards, as well as three
NBA championship rings, while inspiring an entire generation and effectively changing the
game.
Curry’s coach, Steve Kerr, who was hired by the Warriors in 2014, ushered in a system of fast
pace and three-point shooting that maximized Curry’s skillset. In fact, Kerr, a former player
himself, shot 45.4% from behind the three-point line over the course of his career, the best
percentage of any player in NBA history. Kerr, who won 5 championships as a player, has
coached the Warriors to three championships in the 2010s behind the shooting of Curry. The
Warriors broke the typical prototype of a championship team; the team played at a fast pace,
shot 30+ three-pointers per game, and utilized a lineup of undersized players. Golden State
proved that the three-point shot is not a gimmick, but instead an efficient tool that, if utilized
correctly, can be the driving force behind a dynasty.
The Decline of the Mid-Range Shot
Given the dramatic increase in three-point shots attempted, shots from other locations on the
court have declined as a result. The primary victim of the rise of the three-pointer has been the
mid-range shot. The mid-range is the area of the court between the paint and the three-point
line; the shot is too close to the basket to be a three, but is far enough way that it is not
considered a layup or floater. As the graph to the right indicates, since 2003, teams have
steadily moved away from the mid-range jump shot in favor of taking more 3s. As one of the
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leading teams behind the three-point revolution, the Warriors 2015 championship coincides
with when the three-point shot overtook the mid-range shot in terms of percentage of league
shot attempts.

Figure 4: The Rise of the Three & Decline of the Mid-Range
(FlowingData)

The decline of the mid-range is rooted in analytical research. As Wade McCagh synopsizes in
his article How Spatial Analytics Killed The Mid-Range Jump Shot: “It took the most
advanced spatial tracking technology we've seen in sports to reveal a simple truth: 3 points are
more than 2” (McCagh 1). The decline of the mid-range is truly that simple; if a player gets
three points for making a 23.8 foot jump shot, but only two points for a 23.7 foot jump shot
(assuming they are shooting from straightaway), the three-point shot is undeniably the more
efficient shot.
To put it another way, if a player manages to shoot 50% from mid-range in a season, they are
considered an extremely good shooter. Despite that, over the course of that season, that
shooter will only average 1 point per shot from the mid-range. If this shooter were to aim to
score 1 point per shot while attempting three-pointers, they would only have to make 33.33%
of their shots to reach this level of efficiency. The difference between these percentages is
huge; if the shooter can shoot within 16.67% of their mid-range percentage on three-pointers,
they will be a more efficient scorer of the basketball. The additional point for a three-point
shot more than compensates for the increased difficulty of the deeper shot attempt, therefore
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teams have almost completely abandoned the mid-range attempt as part of their offensive
strategy.
All in all, there has been a staggering shift in strategy in basketball over the past few decades,
and it is rooted in data analytics. Statistical analysis has helped reveal the inefficiency of the
mid-range jump shot and has spurred the three-point revolution that has overtaken basketball
at all levels.
LITERATURE REVIEW
With the rise of data analytics and the three-point revolution in the NBA, a multitude of
scholarly research has been conducted examining player and team performance, as well as
shot selection and spatial analysis. This section of the paper will examine these past studies to
provide an overview of the prior research completed in this area of study.
Utilizing Analytics to Evaluate Individual Player Performance
The first area in which several studies have been completed is using data analysis to evaluate
individual player performance. Points, assists, rebounds, and other basic counting stats are the
typical metrics used to evaluate players, yet they do not encapsulate all the potential impact,
positive or negative, a player can have on the court. For this reason, researchers have
developed different, more advanced metrics for evaluating individual performance that
consider more than just basic statistics.
A 2011 study, Evaluating Basketball Player Performance via Statistical Network Modeling,
introduces new metrics to evaluate player performance that considers the interaction effects
by teammates. The study was presented at the 2011 MIT Sloan Sports Conference by James
Piette, Lisa Pham, and Sathyanarayan Anand. The goal of the study is to evaluate how
effective certain combinations of players are while measuring the contributions of each
individual player using statistics. The study acknowledges that the commonly used plusminus statistic inherently has biases, and the metric the researchers use attempts to correct for
this.
The study evaluates players based on three areas, offense, defense, and total efficiency, and
computes player centrality scores to measure the importance of each player to their respective
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teams. Using those scores, the researchers identified several players that overperform on
offense, but underperform on defense, as well as those who underperform on offense, but
overperform on offense. One of the advantages to the study is that it identifies players who are
currently under-utilized by their teams; they overperform in one or multiple areas of the game,
yet their centrality scores are low. Generally, the study contributes an algorithm to the
growing body of metrics used to evaluate individual player performance, taking the
contribution of teammates into account. (Piette, et al. 1)
In another study, Cervone et al. (2014) incorporate other factors into individual player
evaluation. While most analytical models focus on the results of the end of a possession, such
as points, turnovers, or assists, this model considers players’ decisions to pass, dribble, or
shoot over the course of the possession. By using the metric of expected possession value
(EPV), this source offers a different type of analysis of offensive play in basketball.

Figure 5: EPV of Spur's Possession (Cervone et al.)

The graphic above visually conceptualizes EPV. At this given point in the San Antonio Spurs’
possession, Kawhi Leonard, the player with the ball, must decide whether to shoot or pass,
and if he passes, which player to pass to. The EPV metric evaluates the probable points that
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result from each of his options, highlighting that the smartest play is to pass the ball to Danny
Green for a corner 3. Typical statistical analysis would only acknowledge Leonard’s decision
if he either scored or assisted a teammate’s made shot. The EPV metric instead evaluates
Leonard’s decision making; if he passes the ball to Danny Green, regardless of whether or not
Green makes the shot, Leonard is credited with making the best play. This study, and the
introduction of EPV as a metric, further contributes to the tools used to evaluate individual
performance, and “overcomes many shortcomings of the conventional boxscore approaches to
analyzing the game” (Cervone, et al. 1).
In evaluating player performance in basketball, most studies and metrics focus on a player’s
contributions on the offensive side of the game. The Dwight Effect: A New Ensemble of
Interior Defense Analytics for the NBA, a 2013 study by Kirk Goldsberry and Eric Weiss,
instead introduces spatial and visual analytics that evaluate multiple aspects of defensive play.
The study investigates “The Dwight Effect”, named after dominant defender Dwight Howard,
which is defined as “the ability of an interior defender to reduce the efficiency of an
opponent’s shooting behavior” (Goldsberry & Weiss 3). Common statistics, such as steals and
block shots, do not always accurately correlate to a player’s defensive effectiveness; this
study accounts for both the efficiency and frequency of shot attempts of opposing players.
The incorporation of frequency as a key variable
is relatively unprecedented, as it attempts to
account for the fear factor of great defenders.
Some interior defenders, such as Dwight Howard,
have a presence that deters opposing players from
attempting shots around them, which the
Figure 6: Opponent Field Goal Percentage by Individual Defender
(Goldsberry & Weiss)

frequency variable attempts to account for.

The study seeks to accomplish two goals: to present new metrics to evaluate defensive
effectiveness in the NBA, and to acknowledge the challenges of measuring defensive
performance. By comparing the efficiency and frequencies of opposing offenses when a
certain player defends the interior, the researchers were able to identify the best, as well as the
worst, interior defenders in the NBA over the course of the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013
seasons.
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Utilizing Analytics to Evaluate Shot Selection
Another major area in which data analytics has had a distinct impact is shot selection. Recent
studies have used advanced metrics to evaluate the efficiency of shots from certain positions
on the court and have brought about increased emphasis on the importance of shot selection in
basketball. Other studies have focused on spatial analysis, which takes into account both the
location of shots taken and the distance of defenders.
A 2012 study, The Problem of Shot Selection in Basketball, by Brian Skinner, offers
interesting insight into shot selection in the NBA. Skinner investigates the decision making of
players, particularly their decision of whether to take a shot or pass the ball. The analysis
explores what shots are worth taking and which shots should be passed up and takes
extraneous factors such as time left on the shot clock and probability of a turnover into the
analysis. In the NBA, teams have 24 seconds to attempt a shot and if the team does not
attempt a shot within the shot clock, it expires and the team loses possession of the ball.
Skinner uses a theoretical model of the shot selection process in hopes of answering the
question “how likely must the shot be to go in before the player
should take it?” (Skinner 1).
As Skinner finds, the shot clock has a large impact on shooting
habits. As the charts to the right depict, as the shot clock gets
closer to expiring, teams attempt shots at a higher rate (out of
necessity), but the quality of those shots decreases. For the
games in his dataset, Skinner’s analysis finds that: “For NBA
teams, the expected number of points per possession is 0.86, or
0.83 if one considers only possessions lasting past the first

Figure 7: Shooting Rate by Shot
Clock Time (Skinner)

seven seconds of the shot clock” (Skinner, 6). If teams were to
employ the optimal shooting strategy identified by Skinner’s model, that expected number of
points per possession would rise to 0.91, or 0.88 if one only considers possessions that last
past the first seven seconds of the shot clock. The rise from 0.86 to 0.91 is hugely impactful:
“This improvement of 0:05 points/possession translates to roughly 4.5 points per game…
such an improvement could be expected to produce more than 10 additional wins for a team
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during an 82-game season” (Skinner 6). In short, Skinner’s study highlights the importance of
shot selection in basketball and how it can have a profound impact on winning.
Another study, Quantifying Shot Quality in the NBA, evaluates shot quality in a different way.
This Second Spectrum study introduces two new metrics in effective shot quality (ESQ) and
EFG+, effective field goal percentage minus effective shot quality, which computes shooting
ability above expectation. As the study highlights, the current advanced metric to evaluate
shooting efficiency is effective field goal percentage (EFG%), which accounts for the reality
that three-pointers are worth 1 more point than two-point shots. The study introduces ESQ
and EFG+ to offset the fact that EFG% confounds the quality of any shot attempted and the
ability of a player to make that shot.

Figure 8: ESQ and EFG+ (Chang et al.)

The charts above depict EFG% for different locations on the court. The mid-range area is by
far the least efficient area on the court according to the effective field goal percentage metric.
The issue with EFG% is that it does not account for shot quality. If Player A attempts
significantly harder shots than Player B, and as a result Player B makes more shots than
Player A, Player B will have the higher EFG%. That is not necessarily a fair evaluation of
Player A, because if Player B was able to take the same quality shots that Player B attempts,
Player A may very well be a better shooter.

- 13 -

The Decline of the Mid-Range Jump Shot in Basketball
Honors Thesis by Shawn Kilcoyne
This is where ESQ and EFG+ come in. The following graphic depicts ESQ and EFG+ applied
to NBA players:

Figure 9: Player Specific ESQ and EFG+ (Chang et al.)

This graphic proves that some players must take much more difficult shots than others. For
three-pointers for example, Spencer Hawes has an effective field goal percentage of 68.7%,
while Kevin Durant has an EFG% of 62.1%. That said, Kevin Durant, a former NBA league
MVP, faces much tougher defense every game than Spencer Hawes, a career role player. The
ESQ metric takes this into account and shows that Hawes takes significantly easier threepointers than Durant (Chang et al. 6). All in all, this study introduces two new metrics useful
for evaluating shot quality and efficiency at the NBA level.
Utilizing Analytics to Evaluate Shot Quality by Location
Another study by Kirk Goldsberry, CourtVision: New Visual and Spatial Analytics for the
NBA, introduces a “new ensemble of analytical techniques designed to quantify, visualize, and
communicate spatial aspects of NBA performance with unprecedented precision and clarity”
(Goldsberry, 2012). In this study, Goldsberry also introduces new metrics in an attempt to
make up for the oversimplifying nature of commonly used statistics. Goldsberry’s
CourtVision metrics account for spatiality, clarifying that “although conventional metrics are
simple ways to summarize the probability of a shot attempt resulting in a made basket, they
fail to expose true differences in shooting ability across the league” (Goldsberry, 2012). In
this particular study, Goldsberry uses the CourtVision model to identify the best shooters in
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the NBA during the 2010-2011 NBA season, pinpointing Ray Allen and Steve Nash as the
league’s best shooters.
Goldsberry also contributed to Andrew Miller, Luke Bornn, and Ryan Adams’ research on
spatial analysis of professional basketball. In that study, the researchers conducted a spatial
pattern analysis to identify to the best
shooters from different locations on
the court. Based on the results, Miller
et al. discovered great variety in shot
selection, as well as effectiveness on
those shots, amongst NBA players. In

Figure 10: Factorized Point Process (Goldsberry, Miller, Bornn, Adams)

summary, “some shooters specialize in certain types of shots, whereas others will shoot from
many locations on the court” (Miller et. al 5).
Another study, Live by the Three, Die by the Three? The Price of Risk in the NBA by Matthew
Goldman and Justin M. Rao, looks into how a team determines the right proportion of twopoint and three-point shots to take over the course of a game. In determining the best
combination of shot attempts, a trade-off exists between risk and reward. Goldman and Rao
highlight that early in a game, teams should maximize points per possession, regardless of
risk, and therefore should attempt more three-pointers. That said, late in a game, the winning
team should pursue low risk, “predictable scoring opportunities”, while the trailing team must
shoot more threes in order to tighten the score (Goldman & Rao 2).
One of the main takeaways from this study is that the leading team takes more three-pointers
when the best play would be to take more high percentage shots. This trend continues as the
winning team’s lead decreases: “As a lead decreases, the leading team should become more
risk-neutral, but teams in this circumstance actually tighten up and become more risk averse,
contrary to what their risk preferences ought to be to maximize the chance of winning the
game” (Goldman & Rao 8). This is an important finding; the statistics show that teams that
are trying to solidify a win do not shoot the shots that would give the team the best chance of
winning. Further research needs to be done to see if the mid-range jump shot could be an
effective shot for the winning team late in games.
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Paul Zuccolotto, Marica Manisera, and Marco Sandri also conducted a study on shooting
performance of players in high-pressure game situations. Using data from the Italian Serie A2
Championship, the researchers identified that the situation “most impacting the scoring
probability is when the shot clock is about to expire and, for free throws, when the player has
missed the previous shot” (Zuccolotta et al. 587). The study investigates players’ personal
reactions in the last two seconds before the shot clock expires, as well as when the score is
within a reasonable range within the last five minutes of a game. The findings of this study
contribute to the growing body of analytics research related to basketball that are increasingly
used to measure and evaluate player and team performance.
The existing body of research highlights the impact the rise of data analytics has had on
player evaluation in the modern NBA. While the current research covers how analytics are
used to evaluate individual player performance, shot selection, and shot quality by location,
the research focusing specifically on the mid-range is not extensive. This paper aims to add to
the existing body of research while identifying the key contributing factors to the decline of
the mid-range jump shot in the modern NBA.
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DATA ANALYSIS
Data:
The data analysis in this paper is based on a dataset of statistics gathered from fourteen
seasons worth of NBA data. The larger dataset is split into two equally sized data sets of
seven seasons. The first dataset is made up of NBA statistics from the 2005-2006 season
through the 2011-12 season. The second dataset is made up of NBA statistics from the 20122013 season through the 2018-2019 season. As identified in the literature review, the 20122013 NBA season represents the beginning of the three-point revolution, making it a logical
split for evaluating the shift in shooting habits in the NBA.
The data was retrieved from NBA.com/statistics. Microsoft Excel was used to organize the
data. See Appendix A for a snippet of the dataset. Most of the values in the dataset are based
on season totals, such as the total amount of shot attempts from designated areas on the court
over the course of a full season. For this study, shot attempts are specified as coming from one
of five areas on the court: the restricted area, the paint, the mid-range, corner three-pointers,
and above the break three-pointers; see Appendix B for a visual illustration of these shot
locations.
It is important to note that there are a few outlier data points that deviate from the typical 82
game NBA season. The 2011-2012 NBA season was only 66 games due to the lockout
shortened season following disputes between players and owners regarding the league’s
collective bargaining agreement. All data points for the 2011-2012 season are based on 66
games, therefore the 2011-2012 season represents an outlier datapoint for some charts used in
the analysis. Also, the Boston Celtics and Indiana Pacers only played 81 games each in the
2012-2013 season due to the tragic events of the Boston Marathon bombing leading to the
teams’ April 15, 2013 game being cancelled.
The dataset includes the following 30 variables:
Variable:
Year
GP
RAFGM
RAFGA

Description:
NBA Season
Games Played
Restricted Area Field Goals Made
Restricted Area Field Goals Attempted
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PFGM
PFGA
MRFGM
MRFGA
C3FGM
C3FGA
ATB3FGM
ATB3FGA
FTM
FTA
PF
PFD
OFFRTG
DEFRTG
AST%
AST/TO
PACE
OREB
DREB
TREB
AST
TOV
STL
BLK
Wins
Rank

Paint Field Goals Made (Non-Restricted Area)
Paint Field Goals Attempted (Non-Restricted Area)
Mid-Range Field Goals Made
Mid-Range Field Goals Attempted
Corner Three-Point Field Goals Made
Corner Three-Point Field Goals Attempted
Above the Break Three-Point Field Goals Made
Above the Break Three-Point Field Goals Attempted
Free Throws Made
Free Throws Attempted
Personal Fouls
Personal Fouls Drawn
Offensive Rating
Defensive Rating
Assist Percentage
Assist to Turnover Ratio
Pace of Play
Offensive Rebounds
Defensive Rebounds
Total Rebounds
Assists
Turnovers
Steals
Blocks
Games Won
League Standing (based on Wins)

Methodology:
The two datasets are analyzed by two primary methods. First, visualization tools will be used
to illustrate the statistic trends in shooting habits over the past 14 years. Graphs highlighting
the trend over the years, boxplots based on variables such as offensive strength and league
rank, and distribution plots based on league rank are used to visualize the data. Secondly, a
linear regression model will be used to measure the effect selected variables have on an NBA
team’s chance of winning. Python is the primary software with which this analysis was
completed.
For the visualization tools, each type of chart displays different measures of the data. The
statistics trending graph simply showcases the totals for a selected variable each year. When
graphed together, the trend of the data can be seen visually. Boxplots are used to identify the
interquartile range, which is the 25th to the 75th percentile of the data. The middle line
highlights the median of the selected data set. Scatterplots are used to observe the relationship
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between two variables; the dots represent individual datapoints, while the accompanying line
graphs highlight the strength of the relationship between the two variables. The distribution
plots identify the most common count of the data, as well as the shape of the sample
distribution.
The linear regression model is used to predict the number of wins a team will have based on
selected variables from the dataset. The model is computed using ten variables, as opposed to
the 30 variables that influence the visualization charts. The use of fewer variables simplifies
the model and gives a general idea of the variables that impact winning. See Appendix C for a
snippet of the simplified database. The ten variables are:
Variable:
RAFGA
PFGA
MRFGA
C3FGA
ATB3FGA
DEFRTG
PACE
TREB
AST
TOV

Description:
Restricted Area Field Goals Attempted
Paint Field Goals Attempted (Non Restricted Area)
Mid-Range Field Goals Attempted
Corner Three-Point Field Goals Attempted
Above the Break Three-Point Field Goals Attempted
Defensive Rating
Pace of Play
Total Rebounds
Assists
Turnovers

Visualization Findings:
The initial findings focus on the change in shooting distributions for teams over the 14-year
period analyzed. A statistics trending analysis was completed for the field goals attempted by
teams on average over the course of each season from the 2005-06 season through the 201819 season. The number of field goal attempts from each of the major areas on the court was
analyzed: the restricted area, the paint outside the restricted area, the mid-range, the corner
three pointer, and the above the break three pointer. Again, it is crucial to note that only 66
games were played in the 2011-12 season, so this represents an outlier data point on each
graph.
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Over the period analyzed, there is a slight
positive trend in number of restricted area field
goals attempted. In the 2005-06 season, teams
averaged 2100.6 restricted area field goal
attempts over the course of the season, compared
to 2414.2 attempts in the 2018-19 season, a
313.7 shot increase. That change represents a
14.9% increase from the restricted area attempts
Figure 11: Restricted Area Field Goal Attempts by Year

in 2005-06.
There is a clear positive trend in the number of
paint field goal attempts (non-restricted area). In
the 2005-06 season, teams averaged 836.9 paint
field goal attempts, compared to 1170.7 attempts
in the 2018-19 season, a 333.8 shot increase.
That change represents a 39.9% increase from
the paint attempts in 2005-06.

Figure 12: Paint Field Goal Attempts by Year

There is a clear negative trend in the number of
mid-range jump shot attempts. In the 2005-06
season, teams averaged 2230.9 mid-range
attempts over the course of the season, compared
to 1109.2 attempts in the 2018-19 season, a
1121.7 shot decrease. That change represents a
50.3% decrease from the mid-range field goal
attempts in 2005-06.
Figure 13: Mid-Range Field Goal Attempts by Year
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There is a clear positive trend in corner threepoint attempts. In the 2005-06 season, teams
averaged 369.2 corner three-point attempts,
compared to 596.1 in the 2018-19 season, a
226.9 shot increase. This change represents a
61.4% increase in corner three-point attempts
since the 2005-06 season.

Figure 14: Corner Three-Point Field Goal Attempts by Year

There is a very clear positive trend in above the
break three-point attempts. In the 2005-06
season, teams attempted 927.2 above the break
three-point shots, compared to 2009.5 attempts
in the 2018-19 season, a 1082.3 shot increase.
This change represents a 116.7% increase from
the average number of above the break threepoint attempts in 2005-06. Furthermore, the
Figure 15: Above the Break Three-Point Field Goal Attempts by Year

average number of attempts in the 2012-13

season was 1170.0, a 242.8 shot increase from 2005-06. The average number of attempts then
increased by 839.5 attempts from 2012-13 to 2018-19.
The next stage of the analysis focuses on looking at how these shooting habits differ based on
the strength of a team’s offense, as well as how these shooting habits translate to winning.
Boxplots and distribution plots were used in this part of the analysis. For many of the
boxplots, the data is dispersed based on a team’s offense being neutral, weak, or strong; in this
analysis, offense strength is quantified using Offensive Rating, a metric which measures a
team’s offensive points produced per 100 possessions. For the boxplots that deal with rank,
the rank is based on where a team finished in terms of number of wins relative to all 30 teams.
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As the boxplots to the left depict, the frequency
of mid-range jump shot attempts clearly
decreased in the 2012-2019 data compared to
the 2005-2012 data. Interestingly, there was no
major difference in mid-range field goals
Figure 16: Mid-Range Attempts by Strength of Offense

attempted for teams with strong or weak
offenses. On the other hand, there are clear
differences in the offensive strength of teams in
the 2012-2019 dataset based on mid-range field
goal attempts. Strong offensive teams attempted
the least amount of mid-range shots, while the
weakest offenses utilized the highest number of
mid-range attempts.

Figure 17: Mid-Range Attempts by Team Rank

The use of the corner three-point shot has
changed over the past 15 years. As depicted by
the boxplots to the left, teams in the 2012-2019
dataset attempted more threes across the board
than the 2005-2012 teams, regardless of the
strength of a team’s offense. That said, the
Figure 18: Corner Three-Point Attempts by Strength of Offense

strongest offenses attempted the most corner
three-pointers on average, although it was close
to the level of league average (neutral) offenses.
The weak offenses lagged farther behind, clearly
attempting the least corner three-point shots over
the course of a season.

Figure 19: Corner Three-Point Attempts by Team Rank
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The frequency of corner three-point shooting
directly correlates with winning. As the rank
boxplot and distribution plot show, regardless of
the dataset, top ranked teams utilized the corner
three-pointer much more than lower ranked
teams. The corner three-point shot is a staple of
winning teams.
Figure 20: Corner Three-Point Attempts Distribution Plot by Rank

The use of the above the break three-pointer has
changed. Teams with strong offenses attempt the
most above the break three pointers, while weak
offenses shoot the least amount. The number of
above the break three-point attempts is
Figure 21: Above the Break Three-Point Attempts by Strength of Offense

significantly higher in the 2012-2019 dataset
than the 2005-2012, regardless of offensive
strength. Although it is not a large difference,
teams that attempt more above the break threepointers rank higher in league standings on
average.

Figure 22: Above the Break 3-Point Attempts by Team Rank

In looking for variables that help explain the shift in shooting habits in the NBA over the 14year period analyzed, a surprising variable presented itself as a factor: pace. Pace, a metric
that simply measures the number of possessions a team has over the course of a game, is
typically used to measure how often a team gets out in transition and pushes the ball down
court. After looking at the pace variable in comparison with the shooting statistics in the
datasets, specifically the mid-range field goal attempts, it seems that there is a relationship
between pace of play and a team’s shooting habits.
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First, there seems to be a relationship between mid-range jump shooting and team pace of
play. For the 2005-2012 data, the teams are heavily concentrated in the 1500-2500 MRFGA,
89.0-95.0 PACE area. On the other hand, the 2012-2019 teams are concentrated in the 10002250 MRFGA, 92.5-100.0 PACE area. Teams in the 2012-2019 data set are evidently
shooting less mid-range jump shots and playing at a faster pace of play.

Figure 23: Correlation Between Mid-Range Field Goal Attempts and Pace

After the realization that pace of play is a variable that may influence a team’s shooting
habits, the relationship between pace and the strength of team’s offense and defense,
respectively, was looked at. As the boxplots below show, teams that have a strong offense
play at the highest pace on average. Also, teams with a weak defense seem to play at the
highest pace, while strong defenses play at a slower pace. Across the board, teams in the
2012-2019 data play at a higher pace than teams from the 2005-2012 dataset. That said, pace
itself does not necessarily relate to winning. As the distribution plot depicts, pace increased
across the league from the 2005-2012 period to the 2012-2019 period, but an even distribution
of top and bottom ranked teams played at all different levels of pace.

Figure 24: Pace by Strength of Offense

Figure 25: Pace by Strength of Defense
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Figure 26: Pace Distribution Plot

Linear Regression Model Findings:
The second focus of the data analysis is to develop a model that predicts winning. A linear
regression model using the nine variables identified in the methodology section produced the
following results:

Figure 28: Output for 2012-2019 Data

Figure 27: Output for 2005-2012 Data

The coefficient measures the impact of the variable on the expected number of wins in a
season. For example, a one-point increase in defensive rating (DEFRTG) would result in
1.174 less expected wins in a season for the 2005-2012 data. It is important to note that
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defensive rating measures the number of points a team allows over 100 possessions. By this
logic, a one-point increase in defensive rating signifies a weaker defensive team.
The two variables that impact winning the most, based on the model, are defensive rating and
pace. These variables are measured differently than the other seven, as defensive rating and
pace are measured on a possessions basis, as opposed to season totals. For this reason, it
makes sense that an increase in one of these variables would have a more profound impact on
winning than the same increase in one of the season-total based variables. Defensive rating
had about the same impact on winning for both datasets. Pace had a stronger impact on
winning for teams in the 2005-2012 dataset than teams in the 2012-2019 dataset.
Turnovers had the strongest impact on winning out of the season-total variables, with the
impact being negative for both datasets. Mid-range field goal attempts had a nearly identical
negative impact on winning for both datasets. Corner three-point attempts had a negative
impact on winning for the 2005-2012 dataset, and a positive impact on winning for the 20122019 dataset.
DISCUSSION
The initial trending analysis highlights the major focus of this paper. Shot attempts from the
mid-range have consistently declined across the NBA over the past 14 years, with a
significant plummet in mid-range shot attempts from the 2012-2013 season on. This analysis
confirms the statistical decline of the mid-range, as well as the types of shot attempts that
have replaced those mid-range shots. Above the break and corner three-pointers have both
increased exponentially since 2012. On top of that, paint attempts outside the restricted area,
which are typically floaters and short pull-ups, have increased over this time period, with a
significant spike between 2016 and 2019. Restricted area field goal attempts, which include
essentially only layups and dunks, have also increased marginally over the time period.
These trends are indicative of the league-wide change in offensive strategy between the two
time periods. Numerous teams in the mid-2000s focused on playing through star players that
thrived in the mid-range, including league leading teams like Tim Duncan’s Spurs, Kobe
Bryant’s Lakers, and Paul Pierce and Kevin Garnett’s Celtics. From 2012 on, teams evolved
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to create pace-and-space offenses that focused on shooting almost exclusively three-pointers
and layups. Teams in this new era surrounded backcourt and/or wing stars with shooters, such
as LeBron James’ Heat and Cavalier teams, James Harden’s Rockets, and Steph Curry’s
Warriors.
That said, not all teams enacted this new focus on three-pointers and layups to the same
degree. Some teams, such as the Houston Rockets, fully embraced this analytics-based
strategy, and almost completely removed the mid-range jump shot from their team offensive
attack. The Rockets only attempted an astonishingly low 5.5% of their shots from the midrange during the 2018-19 season (the league average was 15.2%). Other teams, such as the
San Antonio Spurs, still heavily depended on the mid-range jump shot as an integral part of
their team’s offensive strategy. With Kawhi Leonard and Tim Duncan leading the team in the
early part of the 2010s, followed by LaMarcus Aldridge and DeMar DeRozen in the latter part
of the decade, the Spurs have structured their attack around their star players, who all excel as
individual mid-range shooters. The Spurs attempted a league-leading 28.2% of their shots
from the mid-range in the 2018-19 season. Despite their conflicting offensive strategies, the
Spurs and Rockets are both top three in the NBA in wins since 2012, suggesting that there are
ways to win with and without the mid-range shot.
The boxplots in the data findings echo this sentiment, as there were no major differences in
mid-range frequency between teams with strong offenses and those with weak offenses. The
highest ranked teams did shoot less mid-range attempts than low ranked teams, but the
difference was not as profound as it was with other shot attempt types. This suggests that the
decline of the mid-range is a league-wide trend regardless of team strength.
Corner three-point attempt frequency did vary by team strength. Top ranked teams attempted
significantly more corner three-pointers than low ranked teams. The corner three-pointer,
which is a shorter distance from the hoop than above the break three-pointers, is an asset of
strong teams. As mentioned, many teams in the new era have focused on surrounding star
players with shooters, and the corner is an essential spot on the court to place a shooter. When
a player drives to the basket, the kickout to the corner is one of the easiest passes that player
can make, so it makes sense that strong teams heavily rely on corner three-point attempts.
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Additionally, over 90% of corner three-pointers are assisted. Teams in this era highly value
three-point specialists, such as the Rocket’s PJ Tucker, whose sole purpose on the offensive
end of the floor is to stretch the floor by spacing to the corner.
Above the break three-point shooting also did vary by team. Teams with strong offenses
heavily incorporate the above the break three into their offensive strategy, while teams with
weak offenses do not attempt nearly as many of these threes. The above the break three is not
strongly related to team rank, but higher ranked teams did shoot slightly more above the break
threes than low ranked teams.
The league-wide shift to play at a faster pace certainly impacts the changes in shot
distribution. Although pace by itself was not related to team rank, strong offenses played at
the fastest pace when compared to weak offenses. Weak defensive teams also played at a
higher pace than strong defensive teams. Logically this makes sense, as teams that allow a lot
of points need to play at a faster pace so that they get more possessions and have a greater
chance of outscoring their opponent.
The league-wide increase in pace and league-wide decrease in mid-range shooting are not
coincidental. As teams have changed to play at a faster pace, they get out in transition more
often, and have less possessions in the half-court. When out in transition, a player is more
likely to attempt to drive all the way to the basket, pull-up for an above the break three, or
kick out to a corner 3-point shooter. At the same time, players are less likely to take a midrange shot when in transition, as that shot is more typical in a slowed down, half-court style
offense. For the 2012-2019 data, pace was positively correlated with restricted area field goal
attempts, above the break three-point attempts, and corner three-point attempts, but negatively
correlated with mid-range attempts. See Appendix D for the correlations between pace and
the five types of shot attempts.
The linear regression model gives an interesting look into the variables that impact winning in
the NBA. For this model, defensive rank and pace were the two most important variables for
predicting winning. This finding follows classic logic in NBA history: offense wins games,
defense wins championships. Teams that play at a high pace attempt a lot of shots and
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therefore score more points, which translates positively to winning. That said, the most
important variable to winning in the model is the strength of a team’s defense. This model
used defensive rating as a blanket metric to measure team defense, so additional research
would need to be done to identify the specific factors that contribute to strong defense. It is
important to note that the model simply suggests that defensive rating and pace are the biggest
predictors of winning of only the nine variables tested. It showcases their importance relative
to the other variables but is not meant to claim that they are the end-all-be-all predictors for
team success in the NBA.
CONCLUSION
This paper sought to investigate the strategic shift away from the mid-range jump shot in the
National Basketball Association in the last decade. The findings of the data analysis
statistically confirmed the decline in mid-range jump shot attempts from the 2005-06 season
through the 2018-19 season. The visualization tools also highlighted the rise in paint field
goal attempts, corner three-point attempts, and above the break threes over the time period.
Another main takeaway of the study is the relevance of pace of play in the shift in shooting
behavior in the NBA in the past decade. Pace, which measures the number of possessions a
team has a game, has increased league-wide over the time period, regardless of the strength of
the team. The increase in pace signifies an increase in transition opportunities, in which teams
focus on getting all the way to the basket for a layup or finding a shooter for an open threepointer. The style of play of this new pace-and-space era differs significantly from that of the
mid-2000s and heavily contributes to the decline of the mid-range jump shot.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A – NBA Database Snippet – 2005-06 Season:
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Appendix B – Visual Illustration of 5 Primary Shot Locations
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Appendix C – Simplified NBA Database Snippet – 2005-06 Season:
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Appendix D – Pace Correlations:
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